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INTRODUCTION 
 
HE compensation of chief executive officers increased by a factor of six 
over the last two decades,1 with the overwhelming share of the increase 
coming not as salary but as “incentive pay,” mostly in the form of stock 
options and cash bonuses triggered by performance metrics.2 Observers from 
outside the corporate governance arena perceive a social problem and 
question the magnitude of this raise. They worry about the fact that 
executives in the United States are by far the world’s best paid.3 On the 
domestic level, observers also worry about a growing inequality of income: 
the average CEO of an S&P 500 company made thirty times more than the 
average American production worker in 1970, but 210 times more in 1996.4 
Inside the world of corporate governance, the question is different, because 
the level of compensation is not by itself seen as a problem.5 Tournament 
economics provides a widely accepted justification for supersize amounts. 
The tournament sweeps in the entire set of aspiring executives, who then 
compete for a small number of top-tier jobs. High-powered competition 
ensues among executives, which is thought to result in better management.6 
                                                                                                            
1. See Bengt Holmström & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s 
Right and What’s Wrong? 10 (ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=441100. 
2. Average total remuneration of executives of S&P 500 companies (adjusted for inflation) 
went from $850,000 in 1970 to $14 million in 2000, falling with the stock market to 
$9,400,000 in 2002. At the same time, average base salaries merely doubled, going from 
$850,000 to $2,200,000. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve 
Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 24-25 (Harv. NOM 
Working Paper No. 04-28, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=561305 [hereinafter Jensen & Murphy 2004]. 
3. See Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market 
Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171 (2004) (suggesting reasons to justify the transnational pay 
gap). 
4. Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 51 (Apr. 1998) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=163914 [hereinafter Murphy 1998]. 
5. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 5, 70-74 (Harv. Univ. Press 2004). 
6. See, e.g., Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 846, 857 
(1981); see also Edward P. Lazear, Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting? (IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 761, Apr. 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=403900 
[hereinafter Lazear 2003]. Citing the absence of downside penalties, Lazear rejects the 
notion that performance incentives have anything to do with observed executive pay 
practices. He argues that equity-based pay ameliorates information asymmetries. The 
executive, an informational insider, trades less-risky cash compensation for riskier equity 
compensation in order to reassure outsiders. This leads to the prediction that equity-based 
compensation is more likely to appear when the firm’s production function is little 
understood. Lazear 2003 at 2-3. 
T 
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The corporate governance question is whether compensation mechanisms 
within the winner’s circle should be subject to exacting standards of incentive 
compatibility. Critics of prevailing practices argue that large payoffs to 
managers should be strictly conditioned on the creation of shareholder value.7 
According to critics, prevailing arrangements fail to impose such conditions 
because the bargaining framework is skewed in management’s favor.8  
Defenders of the prevailing practice answer that the governance framework is 
effective, if not perfect. To support this view, they point to rational 
risk/return trade-offs embodied in the contracts.9 
This article intervenes in the debate to assert that an evaluation of 
compensation practices should concern more than the attributes of the 
bargaining space. The discussants all posit the maximization of shareholder 
value as the firm’s objective and agree that such value can be enhanced by 
aligning management’s interests with those of the shareholders. A follow-up 
question rarely arises: How should the shareholder-beneficiary be modeled 
for the purpose of designing incentives? This Article unpacks the notion of 
the shareholder, introducing a more particularized account in which the 
unitary model of the shareholder disintegrates into a differentiated cast of 
characters made up of investors, speculators, noise traders, fundamental value 
investors, short-term holders, long-term holders, dumb money, and smart 
money. The model is not only fragmented, but is also volatile, for different 
shareholder types predominate in different firms and in different stock 
markets. A normative question emerges concerning the design of equity 
                                                                                                            
7. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried are the leading critics. See generally BEBCHUK & 
FRIED, supra note 5. They build on a large antecedent literature. Before their appearance, 
the leading critic was Professor Charles Elson, who for many years has been describing 
pay practices as a function of board capture. See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, 
Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 651 (1995); Charles M. Elson, 
Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 
50 SMU L. REV. 127, 156-64 (1996). A management-influence hypothesis has also 
appeared in the economic literature. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendil Mullainathan, Agents 
With and Without Principals, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 203 (2000); Marianne Bertrand & Sendil 
Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. 
ECON. 901 (2001). 
8. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 6, 9. 
9. For a theoretical showing along these lines, see Benjamin E. Hermalin, Trends in 
Corporate Governance 13-20 (Sep. 3, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=441360. In Hermalin’s model, stepped-up board monitoring 
causes pay to increase in equilibrium. The insight is that stepped-up monitoring decreases 
the executive’s expectations of job security and induces greater effort, because the 
executive wants to induce a retention decision from the monitoring board. This reduces 
the executive’s utility, causing the executive to negotiate for higher pay. 
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incentive compensation: What kind of a shareholder do we wish the 
incentivized manager to be? 
Most will agree that compensation should be designed to encourage 
managers to take the view of a long-term, fundamental value investor, rather 
than a short-term speculator sensitive to market moods. Yet prevailing 
compensation practices align management interests with those of speculative, 
short-term shareholders. Three possible perverse effects result, all well-known 
in the compensation literature:10 first, speculatively inclined managers can 
rationalize investments in projects that decrease the long-term value of the 
firm; second, speculative incentives encourage aggressive accounting and 
distorted corporate reporting; and, third, speculative incentives skew payout 
policy away from dividends toward open-market repurchases of firm stock, 
with possible adverse consequences. Long-term restraints on the alienation of 
equity awards, whether purchased through the exercise of stock options or 
granted outright, would ameliorate all three problems. These are not seen in 
practice because they diminish the value of equity grants by impairing liquidity 
and inhibiting the reduction of risk by means of diversification. 
Strict incentive compatibility, then, decreases the compensation value of 
equity grants. A question accordingly arises concerning the appropriate 
mediation of this conflict between compensation value and incentive effects. 
Economic theory holds out no calculative solution; there is no general theory 
of optimal incentive contracting with respect to corporate managers.11  
Pending such a theory’s appearance, three alternative approaches can be 
suggested. First, the imposition of alienation restraints can be offset by an 
increase in the number of shares awarded, leaving the present value of 
compensation unaffected. Here a question arises respecting the amount paid, 
for at some point the value of the concession becomes unreasonably large. 
Second, a decrease in value for the sake of incentive compatibility could be 
deemed non-compensable as a normative proposition: Why should 
shareholders have to pay more for correctly aligned incentives? In this case, 
the problem lies in the tournament payoff, because at some point a pay cut 
hurts the firm by dulling incentives. The third approach, which recognizes the 
problems just noted, deems the matter ill suited to rule-based resolution and 
                                                                                                            
10. See, e.g., Randall Thomas & Thomas Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock 
Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 40-46 (2000). 
11. If we had such a theory, there would be nothing to dispute except the level of pay. See 
Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive 
Compensation in Speculative Markets 33 (ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 79/2005, Apr. 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=691142. 
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leaves it to case-by-case negotiation. Here, the problem lies in the flawed 
bargaining context. 
Although there is no theoretical template that correctly determines trade-
offs between compensation and incentive compatibility, economic theory 
does hold out normative guidance. Equity grants make no sense when viewed 
as pure compensation. If a supersize pay-package were the sole objective in 
view, the shareholders would get more bang for their buck by paying cash. 
Equity grants accordingly can be justified only to the extent that they hold out 
positive incentive effects, effects that can be maximized only by imposing 
retention constraints that detract from compensation value. An ordering of 
priorities is implied. Incentive compatibility should come first, with the level 
of compensation being set only in an incentive-compatible framework. So 
long as corporate boards treat incentive-alignment and compensation as 
coequal objectives, trade-offs will follow, and equity compensation schemes 
will continue to hold out perverse incentives.  
Part I describes behavioral variations in the shareholder population. 
Inevitable uncertainty about valuation causes the shareholder in the 
shareholder-value-maximization norm to fragment into diverse behavioral 
types. The shareholder types are presented in a two-sided taxonomy that 
distinguishes the speculative element (made up of noise traders, short-
termers, and dumb money) from the investment element (made up of 
fundamental value holders, long-termers, and smart money). 
Part II looks at stock option and bonus plans to see what kind of 
shareholder they usher into corporate headquarters. Speculators emerge in 
significant numbers, with negative implications for investment policy, 
corporate reporting, and payout policy. Realigning incentives means placing 
painful constraints on the liquidity of management stockholdings, and results 
in a trade-off problem for the design of incentive compensation. 
Part III shows that this Article’s analysis holds negative implications for 
both sides of the debate over executive pay. The critics look for a cure in 
shareholder empowerment without pausing to ask about the incentives of the 
interest holders thus empowered. Shareholder demands are volatile in time, 
and the shareholder interest cannot always be relied upon for productive 
instructions. The defenders justify the prevailing practice as a fair and rational 
risk/return trade-off between the manager and the firm. In so doing, 
however, they model the shareholder-manager no differently than the holder 
of shares in a diversified mutual fund, and so fail to confront incentive 
problems wrought into the contracting pattern. 
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I.  MODELING THE SHAREHOLDER 
 
To value a share is to project returns and then find a factor with which to 
discount them.12  The appraiser studies facts presently ascertainable about the 
company, the industry, and the economy,13 and then takes out a crystal ball. 
Valuations are just guesses, albeit some better-calculated than others. That 
being the case, it comes as no surprise that financial economics has never 
managed to come up with a robust asset-pricing model.14 Absent such a 
model, which would provide a means to verify present prices, there is much 
room for behavioral variation, diversity of approach, and opinion among 
shareholders on matters of valuation. And nearly all matters of concern to 
shareholders ultimately come down to matters of value. Behaviorally 
speaking, then, there is no unitary, empirical shareholder. One only can 
describe a series of binary alternatives: 
 
Speculation Investment 
Noise trading Fundamental value investment 
Short term Long term 
Dumb money (smart money) Smart money (dumb money) 
 
It follows that when the shareholder interest is called on to provide a 
normative benchmark (whether to better align the incentives of executives or 
for some other purpose), the shareholder must be modeled. Modeling means 
choosing among the different shareholder types above. The choice proceeds 
under constraint: one can mix and match characteristics from the various 
rows and from either column, but if one includes too many characteristics 
from both columns at once, a model providing a coherent normative 
instruction will not emerge. 
The shareholder is indeed modeled routinely in boardrooms and in 
corporate and securities law. But the more particular attributes of such 
shareholder constructs tend to be implicit, and often vary with the context or 
over time. Securities law provides an example. Historically, it has regulated 
from the perspective of the investment column, but has been increasingly 
                                                                                                            
12. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 
62-71 (6th ed. 2000). 
13. See ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 260 (2000) (describing firm-specific risk). 
14. See Jeffrey Gordon & Lewis Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities 
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 771-786 (1985). 
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solicitous of the speculative side during the last two decades.15  Corporate law 
presents a contrasting case. It often models its shareholder-beneficiary so 
vaguely as to elide the problem of making menu choices. This is not 
necessarily a failing; the governance problems on corporate law’s table often 
do not require further inquiry into the shareholders’ financial and behavioral 
profiles. For example, when the question is whether management should be 
able to line its pockets with an unfair self-dealing transaction, the law may 
fairly assume a unitary shareholder interest in a fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
Sometimes, however, corporate law does model the shareholder interest more 
particularly. For example, it draws selectively from the investment column in 
articulating the law of takeover defense,16 aligning the long-term shareholder 
with the manager against short-term speculators, so as to justify management 
takeover defenses.17  There follows a more particular look at the columns and 
the categories. 
 
A. Speculation versus Investment 
 
The typology’s headings come from the classic conservative treatise on 
finance and valuation, Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis.18  Graham and 
Dodd divided stockholders into two types. On one side, they placed those 
who play the market looking for quick gains. Against this category of 
speculators, Graham and Dodd contrasted a second category of investors, 
which itself comprises two subsets. The more conservative subset of 
investors looks for safe income streams, analyzing past performance and 
avoiding any forward-looking projection. The less conservative subset looks 
for capital appreciation rather than income, and invests based on projections 
of future growth. They thereby resemble speculators, with the difference lying 
                                                                                                            
15. Prior to 1978, the Securities and Exchange Commission insisted that issuers disclose only 
verifiable financial information. That conservative position was much criticized. See, e.g., 
Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths[,] and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1151, 1188-1191 (1970). The SEC eventually yielded, crafting a safe-harbor rule for issuer 
disclosures of projections. See Proposed Safe-Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act 
Release No. 15,306 (Nov. 7, 1978); see also Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future 
Economic Performance, Exchange Act Release No. 15,305 (Nov. 7, 1978). 
16. Compare Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002), 
with Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against the Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 973 (2002). 
17. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1989) 
(approving defensive tender offer on the ground of protection of long-term investment 
plan). 
18. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND 
TECHNIQUE 33-36 (3d ed. 1951). 
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in the approach taken. Investment in growth requires something “more 
tangible than the psychology of the purchaser,”19 specifically the safety of the 
principal and a satisfactory return, and these goals are best achieved by 
thorough analysis. Such analysis has to address the quality of the company, 
but it cannot stop there. Quantity, in the sense of the relation of the stock 
price to the company’s fundamental value, matters just as much. In Graham 
and Dodd’s picture, the market price is not necessarily the best available 
evidence of the value on offer. Given a market full of speculators, it certainly 
will not be: the best firm in the world is the issuer of just another speculative 
stock if speculators have bid its price to the stratosphere.20  
Investment, said Graham and Dodd, is “good for everybody and at all 
times.”21  But speculation is not always bad, depending on who does the 
speculating and the prevailing conditions.22  Unfortunately, speculation often 
turns out badly. The failure properly to distinguish between the two activities, 
they said, brought about the disaster of 1929.23 
 
B. Noise Trading versus Fundamental Value Investment  
 
The essence of Graham and Dodd’s distinction between speculation and 
investment shows up in the contemporary noise-trading theory of stock 
market pricing.24  The noise theorists, looking to behavioral psychology, 
divide the market into two types of shareholders: noise traders and 
fundamental value investors.25  The fundamental value investors closely 
resemble the less-conservative subset of Graham and Dodd’s investors. These 
actors know that value lies in hard cash flows and invest into those flows 
even as they look for growth. Their timelines tend to be longer, and their 
information sets include only facts respecting the investee and the economy 
(so-called “fundamental value information”), rather than the latest word from 
Wall Street. Market trends and daily noise do not impress them. 
                                                                                                            
19. Id. at 37. 
20. Id. at 38-39. Contemporary observers term their approach “value investing.”  Warren 
Buffett, a student of Graham and Dodd, is a famously successful exemplar. See ROGER 
LOWENSTEIN, BUFFETT: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN CAPITALIST 36-59 (1995) 
(describing Buffett’s relationship with Graham). 
21. GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 18, at 34. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. 
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, 19, 19-22, 23-26 (1990). 
25. For a leading model, see Joseph Lakonishok et al., Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and 
Risk, 49 J. FIN. 1541, 1542-44, 1575-76 (1994). 
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The noise traders resemble Graham and Dodd’s speculators, although 
this model adds an overlay of psychology to reinforce the description of the 
speculative mindset. Noise traders chase trends: when they see somebody 
make a killing on a rising stock, they assume that actor to be smart rather than 
lucky, and they imitate the strategy.26  Noise traders also display behavioral 
biases. They are overconfident in their own investment abilities.27  When the 
stock price is trending upwards, they react too favorably to good news. Once 
a downward trend becomes manifest, they react too unfavorably to bad news. 
In both cases they suffer from availability bias and place too great a weight on 
recent events and easily available information.28  An availability bias also leads 
noise traders to make poorly considered risk-return projections, in which they 
underweight the importance of risks of low probability and high magnitude. 
Finally, at the moment when the trend turns, noise traders can be slow to read 
the handwriting on the wall. Their irrational inaction29 results from a 
hindsight bias, in which traders overweight past events that actually occurred, 
rather than those that might have occurred.30  It also follows from 
confirmation bias, which is the tendency to confirm earlier decisions 
regardless of their intrinsic soundness.31  Noise traders get embedded notions 
about their strategies and shut out information.32 
Trends dominate the resulting picture of market pricing.33  When the 
market trends upward, too much is made of good news, and bad news is 
filtered out. Indeed, market information may influence the price as much as 
(or even more than) fundamental value information. Market information 
most clearly dominates in a bubble, where a feedback loop takes over as one 
                                                                                                            
26. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 24, at 28-30. 
27. Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals 
for its Future, 51 DUKE L. J. 1397, 1459-1460 (2001). 
28. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCIENCE 1124, 1127-28 (1974). 
29. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral 
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 659-60 (1996). 
30. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal To Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on 
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: HUM. PERCEPTION & 
PERFORMANCE 288, 297 (1975). 
31. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCH. 2098, 2099 (1979). 
32. The list of behavioral infirmities goes on. See generally Langevoort, supra note 29; Stephen J. 
Choi & Adam Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7-11 (2003). 
33. For models, see Nicholas C. Barberis, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Model of Investor 
Sentiment, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 307 (1998); Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar 
Subrahmanyam, Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 
1839 (1998). 
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stock price increase feeds the next increase.34  The trend turns only sometime 
after information about fundamental value has ceased to justify the price.35  
Eventually the accumulation of bad news causes investors to substitute a new, 
negative model. Then the trend turns downward, with investors thereafter 
tending to underweight good news.36 
Restating the above in less formal terms, speculative investors experience 
mood swings. Uncertainty is the ultimate cause: no shareholder, whether a 
speculator or an investor, can ascertain fundamental value with surety, even 
while staking significant sums in a highly competitive marketplace. Cool 
rationality can turn out to be the behavioral exception rather than the rule. 
 
C. Short Term versus Long Term 
  
The speculative interest tends to have a short-term time horizon, with the 
investment interest more likely to look long. This follows from their differing 
behavioral characteristics. The market information that drives the speculators 
bears primarily on the near term. The fundamental value that drives the 
investment side tends to have meaning only over the intermediate or long 
term.  
The appellations “short term” and “long term” have come to stand in for 
Graham and Dodd’s terms “speculation” and “investment.”  The change in 
usage has normative implications, as reference to a short-term time horizon 
avoids the pejorative implication of the “speculation” label,37 when coupled 
with strong assumptions about the accuracy of market pricing. Under this 
approach, widely prevalent in the 1990s,38 differing time-horizons hold out no 
                                                                                                            
34. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 44-68 (2000). 
35. See Barberis et al., supra note 33, at 307-08 (describing price underreaction to news). 
36. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE  
113-14 (2000). 
37. Graham and Dodd pointed out that there is no clear line separating the short and long 
terms and that one can “invest” in the short term and “speculate” in the long term. 
GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 18, at 35. 
38. In the 1980s, in contrast, shareholder value maximization practices seemed to hold out 
more of a threat to management’s freedom to invest. See Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices, 
Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
AND CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 6 (Donald H. Chew ed., 1997). 
The leveraged restructuring movement denuded management of investment discretion, 
even as it produced large present payments in the form of tribute to shareholders who 
had long been starved of cash returns. The restructurings’ defenders argued that the 
transactions had the beneficial effect of constraining management’s tendency to invest 
equity capital sub-optimally, even as the transactions had the effect of taking the subject 
firms private, thereby insulating them from left-side shareholder influences. See Michael 
Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 65-72. 
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complications for the model of the shareholder, and “shareholder value 
maximization,” when keyed to today’s stock price, carries a positive 
normative connotation.39  Present-value theory brings all time horizons 
together into today’s market price,40 and under the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH), today’s price reflects fundamental value.41  It follows that maximizing 
today’s stock price maximizes fundamental value and that directing 
management to maximize present value holds out no risk of perverse effects. 
The converse also obtains under this market-favorable view: maximizing 
fundamental value maximizes today’s stock price, so that management 
confidently can invest for the long term without having to worry about being 
punished by the speculative interest in the stock market.42 
Problems come up if the EMH drops out of the picture and market 
underpricing and overpricing become possible. If the market price does not 
automatically self-correct, then it can be driven in incorrect directions by 
short-term, noise-trading shareholders. If pursuing a shareholder value 
strategy causes management to align the business plan with these 
shareholders’ preferences, the result could be underinvestment in productive 
projects and overinvestment in suboptimal projects. 
 
D. Dumb Money versus Smart Money 
  
The final binary—dumb money versus smart money—complicates the 
typology’s division of the world into speculators and investors, as indicated by 
the parentheticals in the chart. The noise traders make up the core of the 
                                                                                                            
The transactions’ opponents claimed that high leverage entailed excessive agency costs 
and choked off new investment. Eventually, history defused the issue by consigning high-
leverage restructuring to its scrapheap. Leveraged restructuring came to be seen as shock 
therapy incurred in the normative transition from post-war managerialism to the superior 
shareholder value regime of the 1990s, under which managers invested for the long term, 
even as they adhered to a norm of present shareholder value maximization. See Bengt 
Holmström & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: 
Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 127-132 (2001). 
39. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1278-87 
(1999). 
40. See Henry Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 
277, 288-90 (1990). 
41. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 154-55 (5th ed. 
2003). 
42. This assumes, of course, that management credibly can communicate its proprietary 
information about future prospects to actors in the market. If it cannot, then a market 
tendency to rely on short-term performance numbers can have perverse effects. See 
William W. Bratton, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case 
Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213, 223 (1999). 
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dumb-money shareholders. But the category can also sweep in an uninformed 
fundamental value investor—someone, for example, who collects stocks with 
high price/earnings ratios in an underdiversified portfolio for the long term. 
The core smart money investor is a well-informed fundamental value 
investor. But the category includes speculative actors as well. Some smart 
money will combine fundamental and market value information, watching the 
noise traders and the market trend. When the noise traders push the market 
upward, bidding up stocks in a feedback loop where an uptick is good news 
that triggers another uptick, smart money certainly can ride along. After all, 
there is money to be made as prices rise; thus did “momentum” funds make 
an appearance in the institutional investment community during the 1990s. 
But the smart money knows when fundamentals do not support the market 
price and, being (relatively) free of behavioral biases, will be ready to be the 
first to bail out when the trend turns. The same insights invite the smart 
money to profit by bucking the trend. If fundamental value does not support 
the market price, then the price inevitably falls. Accordingly, money can be 
made by shorting the stock (or the whole market), or by buying puts. More 
generally, given a lot of noise, some smart money will be contrarian.  
In its contrarian posture, the smart money plays a key role in the scenario 
cited in support of the EMH. The EMH asserts that the market price is the 
best reflection of fundamental value and that new fundamental value 
information gets into the stock price almost immediately,43 even as it accepts 
the existence of dumb money and noise trading. It can do both at once 
because it asserts that smart money trumps dumb money. Dumb money goes 
off in every direction, canceling itself out in the random-error term. Smart 
money goes consistently in the direction of fundamental value, keeping stock 
prices correctly aligned with fundamentals.44 
Under the EMH it follows that supply and demand do not determine 
stock prices. What is on offer in the stock market is money in the future, and 
demand for money is consistently high. The valuation questions go only to 
the amount of money, the time of payment, and the quantum of risk—
questions answered by fundamental value information. Since demand is a 
constant, the only thing that can cause a price to change is new fundamental 
value information. Noise traders, meanwhile, always get wiped out in the long 
run. 
                                                                                                            
43. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 12, at 354-62. 
44. BRATTON, supra note 41, at 159-67. 
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Although the EMH continues to have defenders,45 the contrasting noise-
trading description of the market has been ascendant for more than a decade. 
Erratic stock market behavior encouraged the shift. Under the present 
consensus view, the stock market is a place where noisy supply and demand 
intermix with fundamental value because there is not enough smart money to 
trump the dumb money in the short term.46  Contrarian investment is just too 
risky. Overpricing and underpricing are constant possibilities. But in the long 
run, fundamental value always prevails.  
 
E. Summary: Shareholders and Fundamental Value 
 
The division of shareholders into variegated speculators and investors 
does not preclude the employment of a unitary model, depending on the 
question presented. For example, all shareholders want managers to create 
long-term fundamental value (or at least to be seen as so doing). To see why 
this is the case, try to imagine a stock market bubble occurring in the absence 
of a plausible fundamental value story. Absent the story, investors will have 
no cause to get excited in the first place. Even the dot-com bubble of the late 
1990s began within a fundamental value scenario. The Internet was new, and 
more and more people were becoming acquainted with it, giving rise to the 
reasonable projection that it would become an important center of 
commerce. According to the story, that meant there were going to be 
fantastic profits for a handful of winners who got in early with attractive 
websites, gained market share, and established a brand. Unfortunately, the 
story, although rational, also was highly probabilistic. Worse, it became 
exaggerated in the telling, in the interpretation, and in the wake of actual stock 
price increases. When the market puts present money on the table, the 
connection between that market value and the supporting fundamental value 
story can become attenuated. But the story has to be in place before the 
market takes off; even at the crest of “tulipmania,” there was an operative 
fundamental value story.47   
All of this implies that for a stockholder, whether a noise trader or a 
fundamental value investor, news about fundamental value always matters. 
Beyond this base point, however, a unitary shareholder perspective on value 
                                                                                                            
45. For a contemporary defense, see Eugene Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and 
Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 284-85 (1998). 
46. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 39-54 
(1997). 
47. Peter Garber, Tulipmania, 97 J. POL. ECON. 535, 555-57 (1989) (arguing that rare bulbs had 
high fundamental value due to sales of offshoots). 
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cannot be assumed. As the next part demonstrates, shareholder preferences 
respecting investment policy, financial reporting, and payout policy vary with 
behavioral characteristics, time horizons, and the state of the market. 
 
II.  THE VOLATILE SHAREHOLDER INTEREST AND  
INCENTIVE COMPENSATION 
 
This part draws on the variant shareholder perspectives just described to 
evaluate prevailing compensation practices. It asks two questions. First, what 
sort of manager-shareholder is likely to be produced by prevailing incentive 
compensation practices? Second, does the shareholder interest provide a 
coherent normative yardstick with which to evaluate prevailing practices? 
Section A outlines the terms of standard stock option plans, along with the 
main points made by their critics. Section B asks how the plans affect 
incentives to invest for the long term. Section C looks into the plans’ impact 
on financial reporting. Section D shows how stock option compensation 
affects payout policy. Section E looks into the incentive compatibility of two 
additional components of standard pay packages: cash bonuses and exit 
payments. Section F summarizes. 
  
A. Stock Option Plans: Prevailing Practice and Critique 
  
Under prevailing practices, stock option plans have  10-year durations,48 
with options granted under the plans vesting gradually over the period.49  
When an option vests, the manager is free to exercise it and sell the stock. 
The exercise price is the stock’s market price at the time the option is granted. 
The price remains fixed for the life of the option.50  Critics question both the 
pricing and the vesting practices. 51 
As to exercise prices, the critics make a simple behavioral point: higher 
hurdles require greater effort and therefore hold out a bigger payoff for the 
shareholders. If exercise prices were set higher than the market price, the 
manager would have to create some value in order to put the option into the 
                                                                                                            
48. Thomas & Martin, supra note 10, at 41. 
49. YALE D. TAUBER & DONALD R. LEVY, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 663 (2002). Vesting 
usually occurs ratably over time, but could be based on performance incentives. Id. 
50. Thomas & Martin, supra note 10, at 39. 
51. Bebchuk and Fried also question the numbers granted. They think that fewer would be 
better. According to the empirical evidence they cite, the positive incentive effect declines 
as the number granted increases, so that the benefits of the last option granted may be 
less than the cost. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 138. 
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money. Yet, despite the apparent sacrifice of incentive effect, only a small 
subset of companies price options out of the money, that is, above the market 
price of the stock at grant.52  The practice of leaving the price fixed for the 
life of the option also arguably softens the incentive effect. A fixed price 
rewards the executive for market-wide and sector-wide upward price 
movement, in addition to upward movement due to the company’s own 
performance (which is said to account for only thirty percent of stock growth 
on average).53  So long as the market rises over time, a payoff is virtually 
guaranteed. Indexing solves the problem. Under this, the exercise price is 
reset upward and downward over time to filter out changes attributable to the 
market or sector. Alternatively, vesting could be conditioned on meeting a 
fixed performance target.54  Neither palliative was much seen in practice 
before 2003. Since then, mounting criticism has caused a minority of boards 
to attach performance targets.55 
The critics also question the vesting rules. Once the option vests, the 
executive is free to exercise it and sell the underlying stock. And executives do 
sell ninety percent of the stock purchased upon exercise.56  This, of course, 
defeats the purpose of aligning their interests with that of the shareholders. 
No nefarious intentions need be read in, however. The managers sell in order 
to diversify their portfolios, acting no differently from other rational 
investors. At the same time, nefarious deeds do occur. Executives use inside 
information to time their sales.57 
Other common features of option plans come under fire, most notably 
reloading and replacement. A reloading feature automatically grants the 
beneficiary a new option for every option exercised, with the exercise price 
set at the stock’s price at the time of reloading. According to the critics, the 
new option can serve as a form of protection against subsequent price 
volatility respecting the shares purchased. So long as the stock price spikes 
                                                                                                            
52. Id. at 160. 
53. Id. at 139. 
54. Id. at 139-42. 
55. See Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO Pay More Tightly to Performance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 
2006, at A1 (noting that “30 of 100 major U.S. corporations” base a “portion” of equity 
grants on performance targets, up from seventeen in 2003, but that the targets tend to 
remain undisclosed). 
56. Id. at 176-77. Stock sales are not the only problem. Executives also can employ derivative 
contracts to put themselves in the economic position of diversified stockholders, even as 
they continue to own the stock purchased under the plan. See Steven A. Bank, Devaluing 
Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DEPAUL. BUS. L.J. 301, 323-24 
(1995) (describing risk-shifting in the derivatives market). 
57. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 179-83, 191. 
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above the exercise price of the replacement option during its life, the 
executive gets a chance to profit on the stock purchased, even if overall price 
trend is downward. Stock price volatility thereby becomes a potential source 
of personal profit.58  Replacement occurs when options expire out of the 
money. The firm creates new options to replace them, with the exercise price 
pegged at the lower market price at the time of the replacement grant.59  The 
critics assert that this insures against performance failure and works at cross-
purposes with the original option, which was granted to discourage the stock 
price decline that triggers the new option grant.60 
As a theoretical matter, many of the criticisms are as contestable as is the 
prevailing practice. As already noted, we have no ironclad theory of optimal 
incentive contracting. If we did, the theory would tell us how to design the 
contracts, and there would be nothing to dispute except the level of pay.61  
Absent a theory, there is room for debate about means to induce the 
productive incentives. As to exercise prices, it can be noted that the stock 
price at the time of the option grant reflects the market’s present expectation 
about all future value scenarios,62 expectations shaped in light of the incentive 
compensation scheme. Strictly speaking, as the option goes into the money, 
value has been created with the executive’s participation. As to the absence of 
indexing, it has been argued that there may be reason to reward executives for 
general market increases: the value of good managers may go up during good 
times,63 creating a retention incentive. Even reloading could be the means to 
the end of an optimal long-term incentive arrangement.64  Perhaps the 
additional options also have a positive effect; it all depends on the overall mix 
of incentives, and nobody has a guiding template. Finally, replacement 
options may not look plausible ex ante, but ex post, at the time of expiration, 
new options import continued incentives to succeed.65 
None of these back-and-forth arguments can be settled here. But a 
complex model of the shareholder does sharpen one’s understanding of the 
stakes. The following sections take up three matters particularly likely to 
trigger conflicting interests within the group of shareholders, namely 
                                                                                                            
58. Id. at 169-70. 
59. Formerly, the result also was accomplished by amending the plan to lower the price, a 
practice that ceased when the Financial Accounting Standards Board changed the 
accounting treatment in 1998. Id. at 165-67. 
60. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 10, at 43. 
61. See Bolton, Scheinkman & Xiong, supra note 11, at 33. 
62. Id. at 34. 
63. Id. at 37. 
64. Id. at 35. 
65. Id. at 36. 
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investment policy, reporting practice, and payout policy. In all of these cases, 
the particular shareholder incentive profile fostered by an equity 
compensation scheme can skew the firm’s choices in unproductive directions.  
 
B. Investment Policy 
 
Hypothesize a choice of investments. The firm can invest in a line of 
business much favored in the stock market—say, a broadband network or 
internet access business in the late 1990s. Alternatively, it can invest in a less 
glamorous extension of its core business. The firm does not have the capacity 
to make both investments. Its managers know three things: (1) that the 
market will reward the glamorous investment in the near term; (2) that the 
glamorous investment is highly risky; and (3) that the firm’s capital-budgeting 
analysis yields a slightly higher present value for the less-glamorous 
investment in the core business.66 
In theory, the firm should make the less glamorous investment due to its 
higher net present value. Only an irrationally risk-prone actor would opt for 
glamour. A properly designed equity compensation scheme should not cause 
the firm’s managers to stray from this rational choice. 
Stock option compensation is defended on the theory that it encourages 
the very risk-neutral investment policy favored in financial economic theory. 
It does so by counterbalancing the perverse effects of straight salary. 
Managers on straight salary are thought to tend toward risk aversion. They 
have an undiversifiable human capital investment in the firm and a 
consequent interest in institutional stability. This contrasts with the interest of 
the shareholders, who tend to hold well-diversified portfolios and approach 
risk neutrality in their evaluation of new investments. The conflict of interest 
ripens when the managers choose a low-risk, low-return investment instead of 
the high-risk, high-return investment preferred by the shareholders. Stock 
options counterbalance the managers’ risk-averse tendencies by holding out 
the possibility of future stock ownership.67  But they do not thereby 
automatically make managers risk-neutral. Prior to an option’s expiration or 
exercise, its holder is benefited by an increase in the underlying asset’s 
volatility; high volatility enhances the probability of exercise in the money. 
This creates a potential problem. High-risk choices made from an option 
holder’s perspective may be too risky, decreasing the firm’s long-term 
                                                                                                            
66. The analysis applies a higher discount rate to the glamour investment to compensate for 
its increased risk, with the higher rate resulting in a lower net present value. 
67. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 10, at 38-40. 
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fundamental value even as they make the option more valuable. This is just 
the possibility held out by the glamour investment in the hypothetical. 
Defenders of standard stock option plans acknowledge the problem, 
counseling that the solution lies in setting the right mix between options 
granted and the flow of straight salary tied to the managers’ low-risk human 
capital investment.68   
Although the theory may well be sound, realizing the theoretically correct 
mix of incentives presents a serious practical problem. To see why, let us 
examine the hypothetical from the various shareholders’ points of view.  
We begin on the investment side. A long-term shareholder will want 
management to expand the core competency, despite the short-term 
opportunity cost to the stock price. On a long-term basis, the core investment 
causes the stock price to be higher. A fundamental value investor, viewed 
without regard to the time horizon, will make the same choice, because 
dispassionate risk appraisal shows the investment to be more valuable. But a 
caveat must be entered: a smart fundamental value investor with a short time 
horizon might see things differently, opting for a near-term bump in the stock 
price. 
The noise trader and the short-term holder also will see things differently. 
The market’s near-term reaction matters greatly to both of them, so both 
favor the glamour investment. Dumb money, impressed by a stock price 
uptick, also will favor glamour; indeed, additional dumb money might be 
induced to invest in the wake of the glamour investment’s announcement, 
further driving up the stock price.  
If the firm makes the glamour investment, some smart money observers 
will conclude that the market overvalues it and short the stock. If the smart 
money thereby corrects the overvaluation, there is little risk that stock option 
compensation will encourage suboptimal investing by the firm. But how 
much smart money will be out there to perform the price correction 
function? The investment decisions of publicly-traded firms tend to be 
opaque. Their periodic reports do not lay out precise decision parameters 
such as those assumed in the hypothetical. Accordingly, to perform its job of 
correcting prices, the smart money needs to be more conversant with the 
fundamentals of the firm’s business than any reference to publicly available 
information permits. Quite apart from the costs and risks of short positions, 
smart money will not necessarily be available to correct the stock price. 
We now turn to the managers, assuming them to be the beneficiaries of a 
generous, conventional stock option plan in the middle of its term. They hold 
                                                                                                            
68. Id. at 40. 
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vested, exercisable options, unvested options that can be exercised in the near 
term, and unvested options that can be exercised only in the intermediate 
term. They also hold firm stock purchased through the past exercise of 
options. How these holdings affect the investment decision depends on the 
numbers projected and the managers’ personal preferences. From a long-
term, fundamental value point of view, the glamour investment is suboptimal. 
But it also will cause the stock price to be significantly higher in the short 
term. If the executives are ready to sell the stock they now own or will soon 
acquire through option exercise during the period in which the firm’s stock is 
overpriced due to the glamour investment, they have an incentive to choose 
it. If, on the other hand, the glamour investment is so risky that it holds out a 
possibility of future distress, they may reject it because their job-term 
projections extend into the intermediate or long terms.  
Three points emerge from this exercise. First, the shareholder interest 
does not necessarily send a clear signal on the choice of investment. Second, 
conventional stock option compensation does not necessarily direct managers 
to the creation of long-term fundamental value. Third, managers make stock-
price-based calculations from a smart money position. Even if they realize 
that the glamour investment presents significant negative long-term 
possibilities, they may opt for it anyway, knowing that they can adjust their 
stockholdings during the projected period of overvaluation. They can even 
act before astute market players. There arises a high risk of opportunism. 
Two adjustments advocated by the critics of stock option plans address 
these problems. First, vesting practices could be changed so that the 
managers are locked into long-term positions in the stock. Plans have typically 
required executives to retain a minimum amount of stock, but the minimums 
set have been too low to be meaningful.69  Stricter retention policies have 
been mooted,70 but it is too early to tell whether these will significantly 
constrain an executive’s tendency to dispose of stock in the wake of option 
exercise. Second, executives could be forced to disclose their stock sales in 
advance (rather than after the fact) so as to minimize their smart money 
advantage and increase the stock of information moving market prices in 
correct directions.71  
                                                                                                            
69. See JAMES F. REDA ET AL., COMPENSATION COMMITTEE HANDBOOK 259 (2d ed. 2005). 
70. Id. To be effective, these would have to bar risk-shifting through derivative contracting. 
See Bank, supra note 56, at 323-24. 
71. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 179-81, 191; Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 
68. Late reporting of stock sales was a particularly acute problem where the company had 
loaned the funds that financed the stock purchases. Such loans now are prohibited by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 745, 787-88 (2002). 
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Some advocate a different approach, suggesting that stock options be 
abandoned and replaced by restricted stock plans. These award the stock 
outright and thus ameliorate perverse effects respecting investment policy. As 
has been noted, options gain value as the firm’s stock becomes more volatile, 
perversely tying executive wealth to stock volatility. To the extent that the 
executives’ risk-averse attachment to their jobs does not counteract this 
incentive, a problem is presented. Restricted stock addresses the problem by 
importing more stable incentives. Where options allow for value only in the 
event that the stock price exceeds the exercise price after vesting and before 
expiration, long positions in stock have value on both the upside and the 
downside.72 
The restricted stock argument is correct so far as it goes, subject to the 
important caveat that the substitution of long holdings for options does not 
by itself achieve incentive compatibility. Note that the managers in the 
hypothetical have long holdings of the stock from past option exercises in 
addition to options under the present plan. So long as the executives hold 
significant numbers of shares that may freely be sold in the overpriced 
market, the sub-optimal glamour investment may make them better off. 
Absent retention constraints on those long holdings, the incentive problem 
remains unsolved. The same goes for restricted stock plans.  
Restricted stock has an additional shortcoming. As compared to stock 
options, it holds out an opportunity cost respecting incentives to create 
value.73  Restricted stock amounts to an option with an exercise price of zero, 
and there is no reason to believe zero is an optimal exercise price.74  To see 
the point, compare the award of an option to buy 100 shares at $100 and an 
outright grant of 100 shares, both awarded with the stock trading at $100. 
Assume that the stock price declines to $80 on the day after the grant and 
stays at $80 forever because the firm is badly managed. The holder of the 
                                                                                                            
Before the statue’s enactment, the loans were often forgiven, along with a gross-up to 
cover the income tax payable on loan forgiveness. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 
116. Alternatively, the executive would borrow money from the firm to exercise stock 
options and later put the stock back to the firm to repay the loan, taking advantage of a 
pre-SOX loophole that permitted the executive’s report of the stock sale to be delayed 
until forty-five days after the end of the fiscal year. Id. at 117. 
72. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options 19 (Harvard NOM 
Working Paper No. 03-33, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=415040 
[hereinafter Hall & Murphy 2003]. The corporate world’s failure to take advantage of 
these asserted benefits can be explained in part by reference to accounting and tax 
regimes, which have pushed preferences in the direction of options. Id. at 24. 
73. See REDA ET AL., supra note 69, at 244. 
74. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 170-71; Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 58. 
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option is wiped out; the holder of the stock emerges with 80 cents on the 
dollar despite poor performance. 
These value implications help explain the trend toward restricted stock 
over the past several years.75  From one point of view, it looks like a healthy 
reaction to option-related excesses of the 1990s. But, at a time when stock 
market averages show little forward motion, it also neatly dovetails with the 
self-interest of management. In a retrenching market, restricted stock 
increases net management compensation, not only as compared to the 
alternative of indexed options but even as compared to conventional, fixed-
price options. The restricted stock alternative accordingly makes economic 
sense only if the grants are conditioned on the firm’s meeting strict 
performance targets, or, in the alternative, the firms take care to make the 
grant in the form of a trade-off, with the executive taking the stock in lieu of 
cash salary or bonus payments otherwise to be received.76 
In sum, given variegated shareholders and the possibility of market 
mispricing, equity compensation holds out negative possibilities respecting 
investment policy. The incentive problem is time-sensitive: mispricing occurs 
in the short and intermediate term, but in the long term, fundamental value 
controls. It follows that time holds out the cure. Equity incentive schemes, 
whether in option or long form, should restrict alienation so as to align the 
incentives of managers with the long-term stock price, and thus the long-term 
shareholder interest.  
The analysis changes for a firm with underpriced stock. Here, two 
scenarios present themselves. The first is benign. The firm’s managers, as 
smart money, have a strong incentive to hold until the stock price reaches 
fundamental value, whatever the terms of the plan. The second scenario is 
more troubling. Here, a lack of upward movement in the stock price induces 
impatience and ill-advised investment in overpriced assets. Retention 
constraints are irrelevant in the first case, but beneficial in the second. Across-
the-board restrictions on alienation accordingly appear to be in order.  
Just how long such retention constraints should endure is another 
question, with the answer presumably varying from firm to firm, depending 
on the nature of the business and the state of the market. A one-size-fits-all 
standard still can be suggested: the executive should be required to retain an 
amount of stock that is material in light of the executive’s overall net worth 
until a year after the termination of employment at the firm. 
                                                                                                            
75. See REDA ET AL., supra note 69, at 244. 
76. See Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 59. 
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A final caveat should be entered. For most purposes, long-term stock 
price enhancement and long-term fundamental value creation amount to 
different terms for the same objective. However, they may send different 
signals when an unwanted merger bid appears. The long-term fundamental 
value objective has been used to justify management resistance to a premium 
bid on the ground that the firm’s long-term value under present management 
exceeds the price offered by the bidder. The justification rings hollow in the 
eyes of many because long-term fundamental value investors still tend to 
favor the premium bid. In the hostile offer case, the conflict between long-
term and short-term interests occurs not among the outside shareholders, but 
between inside managers and the outside shareholders as a group. Prevailing 
stock option practices help to realign managers’ interests with those of the 
outside shareholders. Significant, vested, and alienable equity stakes make 
managers less likely to oppose the takeover. Thus did stock option 
compensation apparently counteract the tendency to resist, facilitating 
unprecedented numbers of friendly mergers during the 1990s.77  Strict, 
enduring restraints on alienation would change this. Managers with an equity 
interest that remains unvested in the wake of a takeover paid for in bidder 
stock will have every reason to resist, preferring to leave the pursuit of long-
term value in their own hands rather than those of a hostile stranger. A united 
shareholder interest, then, would want revised vesting restrictions made 
contingent on events in the control market. 
 
C. Quality of Financial Reports 
 
Now consider the impact of equity-based compensation on 
management’s incentives respecting financial reporting. We take a simple, 
relatively benign example of 1990s earnings management: the cookie-jar 
reserve. The firm takes an extraordinary loss in a given quarter respecting an 
unsuccessful line of business. The stock price effect of the bad news is muted 
because the loss is a one-time-only affair. Given, say, a $15 billion company, 
the market will not be overly concerned as between a write off of $1.5 billion 
or $1.75 billion. So, management, which expects actual write-offs over time to 
total $1.5 billion, tops up the present deduction from earnings to $1.75 
billion. The extra $250 million goes to the cookie jar. In a later quarter when 
the earnings come in a tad less than expected, management conveniently 
revisits the loss reserve and reduces it. The released sum supports earnings in 
                                                                                                            
77. See William W. Bratton, The Disappearing Disciplinary Merger 14-18 (Nov. 17, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law & Business Review). 
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the later quarter.78  A cookie-jar stash also can derive from any overestimated 
cost; for example, unrealistically high estimates of any of sales returns, loan 
losses, or warranty costs.79 
Managers in the 1990s held out the shareholder interest in justifying the 
manipulation. First, investors prefer a time-series of smoothly increasing 
income figures.80  The drawdowns from the cookie jar let management 
construct that steadily rising line of earnings, avoiding volatile income results 
that mean a higher discount rate and a lower stock price. Such income 
smoothing does not necessarily corrupt the trend, even as it beneficially 
reduces volatility. And since the trend determines the long run value, any 
misrepresentation is not material. 
Managers cited the noise traders in the alternative. In the overheated 
1990s market, the noise interest hyped every piece of news about 
fundamental value to such a degree as to make it plausible to argue that 
earnings management serves a higher shareholder interest.81  If, to take a 
much used example, the firm misses its expected quarterly earnings number 
by one cent and the overheated market as a result punishes the stock by 
bidding it down 10 percent, then a reserve that holds out the missing penny 
benefits the shareholders.82  It allows management to anticipate and 
counteract the shareholders’ behavioral shortcomings, protecting the stock 
price from short-term market mood swings. 
                                                                                                            
78. The use of the “big bath” write-off to increase cookie-jar reserves is constrained for 
business exits commenced after December 31, 2002; liabilities incurred in respect of 
closures must now be recognized upon incurrence and not in advance. ACCOUNTING FOR 
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EXIT OR DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting 
Standards No. 146 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2002). 
79. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at NYU Center for Law 
and Business: The “Numbers Game” (Sep. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov 
        /news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt. 
80. Mary E. Barth, John A. Elliott & Mark W. Finn, Market Rewards Associated with Patterns of 
Increasing Earnings, 37 J. ACCT. RES. 387, 398, 412 (1999) (showing that firms with patterns 
of higher earnings have higher price-per-earnings ratios, after controlling for other 
factors). 
81. For a detailed description of quarter-to-quarter earnings pressures in the late 1990s, see 
Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street (Feb. 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=297156. 
82. A ten percent decline based on a one-cent shortfall can be explained as rational. If stock 
traders are skeptical about earnings figures and assume that management accounts 
aggressively, then the one-cent shortfall signals that management’s cookie jars have run 
out and all other aggressive gimmicks have been used to the maximum. Given this read, 
the one cent shortfall signals very bad news. Management, moreover, has no choice but to 
account aggressively. 
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Shareholder responses to these justifications depend on the state of the 
market and the makeup of the particular shareholder. 
We begin on the investment side. The fundamental value investor will not 
favor the manipulation of earnings figures through loss reserves. Since this 
investor only cares about cash flows in the future, it wants an unvarnished 
present report. Management advocacy that results in smoother numbers 
makes it harder to work through to the most accurate valuation. Since greater 
volatility means a higher discount factor, the appraiser needs accurate 
information about volatility so as to make the adjustment. 
The profiles of long-term and smart-money investors will differ. The 
long-term investor, once situated in a stock, presumably will not be 
destabilized when management turns up a couple of cents short of 
expectations in the current quarter. At the same time, earnings management, 
pursued in moderation, will not inflict any significant injury on this investor. 
In the long run, the empirical cash flow absolutely controls, and the long-run 
question is whether the company produces competitively. Therefore, the 
long-term investor could profess indifference to earnings management keyed 
to the short-term interest. The profile alters as accounting manipulation 
becomes more aggressive and holds out a risk of ex post enforcement. An 
accounting scandal means deadweight costs of defense and accompanying 
institutional instability. All of these impair long-term value. Better to submit 
accurate reports in the first place.  
The smart money is supposed to be able to see through the ruse to the 
periodic cash flows, at least so long as the published reports give it an 
adequate basis for so doing. It incurs the cost of the analysis, but, since it is 
smart, it will be doing the analysis in any event. For example, from a smart 
money point of view, there arguably would have been nothing wrong with the 
Enron Corporation’s practice of pumping up its earnings numbers with 
results from sham transactions with special purpose entities, so long as Enron 
fully disclosed the transactions in the footnotes to its financials.83  
Enforcement costs remain a negative, but the smart money, by definition, 
gets out first. 
Now let us consider the speculators. Assume a shareholder buys a stock 
on a trend-chasing basis. The trend is that earnings are rising. The holding 
period is short or intermediate, without a definite termination date. Given this 
profile, an earnings shortfall hyped as bad news could be destabilizing, 
causing this shareholder to sell and incur tax and transaction costs. It follows 
                                                                                                            
83. For a description of the Enron fraud, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of 
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1314-22 (2002). 
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that a little finagling to avoid the firm being short on its earnings projections 
will not be objectionable. Just by arranging the numbers, management 
protects a shareholder from herself and from the manic nature of the market. 
Unfortunately, earnings management also holds out problems for 
speculators, even as they are its nominal beneficiaries. It works well only so 
long as management massages the numbers to protect an upward trend that 
responds by staying on trajectory for at least the intermediate term. Let us 
suppose that the upward trend stalls, causing management to draw down 
from the cookie jar to protect the slope of the line. There will be some 
shareholders who are influenced to hold who might otherwise have sold 
because of the stall. As to these, the income-smoothing may or may not be 
beneficial. It will certainly turn out to be detrimental if events make clear that 
the upward trend was history as of the time of the income-smoothing. Once 
the trend turns down, the manipulation undertaken protectively turns out to 
be injurious. Indeed, all speculative investors’ interests then presumptively lie 
in getting out in the first wave. Where the unvarnished truth prompts that 
sale, income-smoothing injures the holder. The injury is even worse for the 
holder buying in reliance on the manipulated numbers at or after the turning 
point in the trend.  
With earnings management, then, the speculative investor to which 
management caters could turn out to be an injured party. 
 Standard stock option plans do nothing to skew management’s 
incentives to a long-term, fundamental value view of financial reporting. 
Managers who massage numbers protect a trend into which they can sell 
stock purchased through option exercise, pocketing a premium over 
fundamental value. They do so as the smartest of smart money, for they 
control the reports. Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong show this in a formal 
model in which, given large differences of opinion about the value of the 
stock, even a contract that optimally trades off risk-sharing and management 
incentives will induce a short-term orientation and encourage actions that 
feed speculation.84 
Presumably, smart-money shareholders of managers thus incentivized, 
whether noise traders or value investors, will be closely watching the 
managers’ selling activity so as to benefit along with them. These holders can 
protect themselves. A sharper conflict of interest opens up between managers 
employing aggressive accounting and noise-trading, dumb-money 
shareholders who rely on the trend and hold on to the stock.85 
                                                                                                            
84. Bolton, Scheinkman & Xiong, supra note 11, at 6. 
85. Note also an additional conflict between management and the dumb-money interest. 
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Speculative shareholders acted out this volatile behavior pattern in the 
real world over the last decade. In the standard account of the recent 
corporate reporting crisis, managers in the late 1990s, incentivized by stock 
options, used consulting rents to induce auditors to accord a free hand to 
manage bottom-line numbers. Auditors defended the practice by reference to 
the shareholder interest: if the threat to independence did not upset the 
shareholders, then regulators should not intervene to impose their more 
conservative views about accounting choices.86  At the time, the supply-and-
demand dynamic respecting audit services operated to make auditors sensitive 
to the speculative shareholder interest. Unfortunately for the auditors, stock 
market reverses later caused the speculators to take a fundamental value view 
of financial reporting, condemning accounting formerly viewed with favor or 
indifference. The experience of Enron, WorldCom, and other scandals 
ameliorated the incentive problem respecting financial reports by prompting a 
shift in the way investors view the numbers. 
The recent shift in shareholder demand respecting reporting does not 
solve the incentive problem, however. The same shift in demand occurred 
after 1929, with conservatism prevailing long thereafter. But speculative 
demands for aggression eventually returned during the bull markets of the 
1960s and early 1970s. A similar, cyclical return to the speculative perspective 
on financial reporting thus can be predicted to occur at some point in the 
future. When the time comes, unrestricted management stockholdings will 
hasten the transition. 
There again arises a powerful case for retention constraints. A long-term 
restraint on alienation ties management’s interest to long-term cash flows 
rather than constructed numbers in present reports. Here again the need for 
constraint is reduced in undervalued firms, whose managers only want to get 
the markets to see the truth. But a clear distinction cannot be made in practice 
between overvalued and undervalued firms—no one ever knows for certain 
                                                                                                            
Prior to the change of the accounting rules in 2005, stock option compensation did not 
entail a charge to periodic earnings. See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMP., 
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1995). 
Thus could management compensate itself without reporting the arrangement’s economic 
cost to existing shareholders. Of course, smart-money shareholders, whether speculators 
or investors, were not fooled. Dumb money presumably would have taken the earnings 
reports at face value. 
86. RICK ANTLE, P.A. GRIFFEN, DAVID J. TEECE & OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, An Economic 
Analysis of Auditor Independence for a Multi-Client, Multi-Service Public Accounting Firm (Report 
for AICPA, 1997), available at http://ftp.aicpa.org/public/download/members/div        
/secps/isb/0117194.doc. The industry’s advocates also pointed to informational 
advantages and the adequacy of legal liability constraints. 
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which firm is which. Indeed, if the manager of an overvalued firm believes 
the firm to be undervalued, an incentive to overstate results could follow. 
Strict retention rules again are signaled across the board. 
 
D. Payout Policy 
  
Hypothesize a firm with free cash flow. Management has a choice as to 
how to disgorge the money. It can raise the regular dividend (or declare a 
special dividend), or it can cause the firm to repurchase its shares in the open 
market. If the EMH were true and the choice had no tax consequences, the 
shareholders would be indifferent regarding the choice.87  In the real world, 
however, the choice has tax implications. In addition, the real world holds out 
the complicating possibility that stock may be overpriced or underpriced at 
the time of the repurchase.  
Different shareholders will have a different view of the choice. Long-
term taxpaying holders who view the stock as correctly priced or underpriced 
will favor repurchase. Even under the regime of rate parity between ordinary 
income and capital gains introduced by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003,88 repurchase holds out the benefit of a tax 
deferral for long-term holders.89  Short-term and noise-trading holders need 
not disagree. Repurchase announcements are taken as good news and tend to 
trigger a three percent announcement period gain.90  They thus can figure into 
the stock’s momentum. Disagreement breaks out only if the stock is 
overpriced at the time of repurchase. Here, repurchase programs disadvantage 
long-term, fundamental value investors, particularly if they are not smart 
enough to see the temporary overvaluation. A noise trader who overcredits 
the signal might be similarly disadvantaged.  
Meanwhile, standard stock options skew management’s choice away from 
dividends and toward repurchases in all states of the world. Consider the 
choice between a dividend and a repurchase from an option holder’s point of 
view. Dividends are paid to shareholders but not to option holders. One 
dollar paid out as a dividend does an option holder no good unless the option 
is dividend-protected, i.e., unless the option contract provides for a 
                                                                                                            
87. This follows from the irrelevance hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller. See Franco 
Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of 
Investment,  48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
88. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 
752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 46 U.S.C.). 
89. William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. L. J. 845, 852-55 (2005). 
90. Id. at 863. 
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diminution of the exercise price to make up for the dividend. But only 1 
percent of executives have dividend-protected stock options.91  It follows that 
stock option value is negatively related to the firm’s expected dividend 
payout. Assume a manager with a ten-year option. Further assume that the 
firm’s stock price has a volatility of thirty percent, and that the risk-free rate 
of return is five percent. Under the Black-Scholes option pricing model, a cut 
in the dividend yield from two percent to one percent increases the option’s 
value by 18 percent. Cutting the dividend entirely raises option value by 
thirty-nine percent.92 
 Stock options, then, raise the financial stakes of the choice between 
dividends and repurchases, giving managers a strong incentive to prefer 
repurchases. Unsurprisingly, empirical studies show a strong correlation 
between stock options and payout choices. The probability of stock 
repurchase is positively related to the presence of stock options.93  Firms with 
large stock option plans are more likely to announce share repurchase plans.94  
Dividends are strongly negatively correlated with options.95  A study of the 
largest S&P 500 firms from 1994 to 1997 shows that even as the repurchase 
payout rose from seventeen percent to fourty-one percent as a percentage of 
income, the dividend yield dropped steadily from 2.76 percent to 1.41 
percent.96  
In addition, the number of shares repurchased in open-market repurchase 
programs relate positively to the total numbers of options exercisable.97  
Some studies report that firms repurchase gradually over the lives of options 
                                                                                                            
91. Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECON. 2485, 2509-
10 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., Elsevier B.V. 1st ed. 1999). 
92. Scott J. Weisbenner, Corporate Share Repurchases in the 1990s: What Role Do Stock Options 
Play? 9 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Working Paper No. 2000-29, 2000), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2000/200029/200029pap.pdf. 
93. Christine Jolls, Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation 15-17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 6467, 1998), available at http://www.nber.org 
        /papers/w6467. 
94. Mary E. Barth & Ron Kasznik, Share Repurchases and Intangible Assets, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 
211, 238 (1999). 
95. See George W. Fenn & Nellie Liang, Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives, 60 
J. FIN. ECON. 45, 47-48 (2001) (using the Lambert model to show that a one percent 
standard deviation change in the stock option variable reduces dividends by thirty-eight 
basis points). 
96. Nellie Liang & Steven A. Sharpe, Share Repurchases and Employee Stock Options and Their 
Implications for S&P 500 Share Retirements and Expected Returns 17 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Working 
Paper No. 1999-59, 1999), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds        
/1999/199959/199959pap.pdf. 
97. Kathleen M. Kahle, When a Buyback Isn’t a Buyback: Open Market Repurchases and Employee 
Options, 63 J. FIN. ECON. 235, 238 (2002). 
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to reduce the options’ dilutive effect.98  But there also is evidence that firms 
time repurchase announcements around the times stock options are being 
exercised.99  Whatever the timing, the numbers are large. One survey finds 
that firms repurchase roughly thirty-eight percent of the shares underlying 
their option grants prior to exercise.100  The more stock options outstanding, 
the more stock the firms repurchase. Managers admit this. Three-fifths of the 
executives reporting in one survey acknowledged that they instituted an open 
market repurchase program to prepare for stock option exercise.101   
The situation can be corrected in part. Interpolating dividend protection 
in option plans removes the incentive-skew toward repurchases. Of course, 
given a dividend-paying firm, dividend protection increases the value of the 
options; the giveback would be a decrease in the number granted or an 
increase in the exercise price. But, even given dividend protection, 
management may retain the urge to warehouse in advance of exercise, 
particularly in light of the new rules requiring that the option’s cost must be 
deducted from periodic earnings. Now that options cause earnings to be 
lower, there appears to be more reason than ever to reduce the number of 
shares outstanding so that the earnings-per-share figure, so critical in the eye 
of the noise traders, stays as high as possible. 
 
E. Bonuses and Exit Payments 
 
Stock option plans, whatever the shortcomings in their design, have one 
great merit. They condition rewards on the stock price, which in turn is 
determined by free-market actors. Firms also dispense large cash bonuses. 
These could be tied to the stock price, but tend not to be. This section looks 
first into periodic performance bonuses and then into bonuses paid on exit. 
 
1. Performance Bonuses 
 
Many cash bonus plans employ periodic earnings targets. This practice 
returns us to incentives respecting financial reports. Accounting standards 
give management room to manipulate numbers to magnify current results. 
                                                                                                            
98. Weisbenner, supra note 92, at 3. 
99. Konan Chan, David Ikenberry & Inmoo Lee, Do Firms Knowingly Repurchase Stock for Good 
Reason? 2 n.4 (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu 
        /~jgspaper/ 
W_Ikenberry_insiderv6.pdf. 
100. Weisbenner, supra note 92, at 23. 
101. Id. at 8 (citing a 1999 survey of 1600 CFOs). 
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Conditioning bonuses on earnings encourages this, with possible benefits for 
short-term holders and noise traders, at least where the earnings reports cause 
the stock to be overvalued. On the other hand, to the extent that smart 
money investors determine the market price and the stock is valued correctly, 
earnings ruses do not hold out stock price benefits. But the perverse incentive 
remains: the cash bonus scheme still rewards management for putting 
numbers on a page, without spillover benefits to shareholders of any type. 
Other periodic cash bonus awards are tied to particular performance 
targets. To the extent the targets are tied to the improvement of bottom-line 
performance, these bonuses may be unobjectionable. Indeed, in the case of a 
firm with undervalued stock, they may be an effective means to provide 
periodic rewards to effective managers pending the stock’s recovery. In 
addition, these bonuses can be tailored to the performance of particular tasks. 
Unfortunately, however, the practice often falls short. Some performance 
targets lack a strong connection to the improvement of bottom-line 
performance. Consider one common target—spending all the funds in an 
annual budget.102  This has the benefit of being cash-flow based and thus less 
subject to manipulation than an earnings target. On the other hand, it holds 
out a bonus for the act of investment rather than for the longer process of 
investing successfully and realizing projected returns.103  Compare a bonus 
paid for closing an acquisition.104  As with the budget bonus, the target’s 
accomplishment lies within the discretion of the executive payee, and the 
bonus is paid for the act of investing, rather than the result of investing 
successfully.105  Recent results have been particularly dismaying. Despite stock 
option compensation, the period 1998–2001 was the worst in history with 
respect to acquirer losses due to bad mergers.106  In these cases, a unified 
model of the shareholder suffices to condemn the practice; no shareholder 
interest is advanced. 
The criticisms trigger a question. If accounting numbers fall short as a 
performance metric, and the stock price suffices only on a long-term basis, is 
                                                                                                            
102. See JAMES F. REDA, COMPENSATION COMMITTEE HANDBOOK 115-16 (2002). 
103. Unfortunately, these budget-based bonus plans tend to open doors for manipulation. By 
setting thresholds and caps, they encourage smoothing and manipulation of the capital 
budgeting process. See Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 69-75, which recommends 
a linear approach that is not keyed to any particular year’s capital budget. 
104. In addition, when performance targets are not met, they often are lowered ex post. 
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 124-27. 
105. Id. 
106. See Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann & René M. Stulz, Wealth Destruction on A 
Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 758, 
770 (2005). 
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there any reliable bonus metric available from quarter to quarter? Critics of 
the prevailing practice point to cash flow as an alternative metric. Private 
equity firms use cash flows to reward the managers of leveraged-buyout firms, 
triggering bonuses on the generation of cash flows sufficient to service 
debt.107  Other firms reward managers when cash flows exceed the cost of 
capital.108 
Consider, as a possible variation on this theme, the dividend. Oliver Hart 
shows that in an ideal (and taxless) world, first-best results easily can be 
achieved with an all-common-stock capital structure and a simple incentive 
compensation system. Hart describes a simple two-period situation where the 
firm is founded at t = 0 and liquidated at t = 2, with an intermediate decision 
respecting liquidation or continuance to be made at t = 1, along with a 
dividend payment. Hart would make the compensation of the manager 
depend entirely on the dividend d. That is, incentive compensation I should 
equal   (d1 + d2), where B is a proportion of the firm’s total returns. If the 
payment also covers liquidation proceeds, where I =     [d1 + (d2, L)], the 
manager can be expected to make an optimal decision respecting liquidation 
at t = 1. If the expected value of L at t = 1 is greater than the total returns 
expected at t = 2, the firm is liquidated at t = 1 and no costly contracting 
designed to align the manager’s incentives with those of outside investors is 
necessary.109  The problem, in Hart's conception, is that the bribe    required 
to align management incentives with those of outside security holders is 
unfeasibly large.110  Accordingly, a complex capital structure must be devised 
in order to align incentives in the direction of optimal investment and insure 
that the actor with the appropriate incentives controls the assets.  
In theory, then, the dividend cannot feasibly serve as the exclusive basis 
for measuring executive pay. But might it serve a limited purpose as a metric 
for periodic cash bonuses? Unlike accounting numbers such as periodic 
                                                                                                            
107. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 2, at 76. 
108. Id. at 76-77. 
109. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 146-48 (Clarendon Press 
1995); see also Anat R. Admati and Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of 
Venture Capitalists, 49 J. FIN. 371 (1994) (articulating a fixed-fraction model of venture 
capitalist participation in the decision of whether to continue). In the model, there is no ex 
ante prospect of firm continuance in the event of poor results; in the real world, managers 
do derive private benefits from asset management and might opt to continue. 
110. The large    is conceded in venture-capital financings and private-equity restructurings. 
But the context is different from that of the pay debate. Venture capital and private equity 
both involve arm’s-length negotiations with outside equity capital that exercises control, 
and transaction structures share a limited duration. The pay debate concerns mature 
publicly traded firms, with their separation of ownership and control, and an implicit, 
unlimited time horizon. 
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earnings, the dividend follows from actual operations and cash flows. Unlike 
the stock price, it is not the product of valuation under uncertainty. A 
dividend-based bonus scheme would encourage firms to pay dividends, 
alleviating problems of overinvestment and excess reliance on open market 
stock repurchases. The question is whether a dividend-contingent bonus 
would cause the opposite problem, underinvestment. Dividends, like bonuses 
contingent on acquisition closings, follow from actions within the zone of 
management discretion. Managers seeking larger bonuses could divert cash 
flows needed to finance good projects into dividend flows. But there could be 
countervailing incentives. Managers holding stock options subject to retention 
constraints would retain an incentive to make good long-term investments. 
Given such a long-term incentive alignment, a dividend-based bonus might 
have the limited effect of causing the managers to raise one notch the hurdle 
rate applied in evaluating investments, which need not be a bad thing. The 
matter would come down to the amount of the dividend-based bonus: it 
should import an incentive toward objective evaluation of new investments, 
without skewing hurdle rates to destructive, uneconomically high levels. 
That said, a dividend-based bonus suits only mature firms with steady 
cash flows. For a contrast, hypothesize a firm at an early growth stage of its 
life cycle with an investment set that holds out excellent returns for the 
indefinite future. Further hypothesize that the firm seriously pursues an 
incentive-compatible, long-term equity compensation scheme. Stock 
purchases through option exercises are locked down so that executives at all 
times have a material portion of their wealth tied to the long-term 
performance of the firm’s stock. Regular salaries are capped at $1 million per 
year in light of Internal Revenue Code section 162(m).112  Finally, cash 
bonuses are paid only in tandem with dividend announcements, with the 
payment mechanism designed so that no perverse incentives arise respecting 
investment policy. The scenario implies a problem: as of t = 0, the top team 
has to wait for the long term to come about before receiving big payoffs. The 
long wait fails to synchronize with tournament economics. As of t = 0, any 
potential manager with bargaining power will reject the terms of the 
compensation plan. At t = 1, an impatient manager might look for a job 
                                                                                                            
112. Internal Revenue Code § 162(m) (2005), enacted in 1994, limits the deductibility of 
straight salaries to $1 million; compensation beyond $1 million is not deductible unless 
conditioned on a link to performance. 
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elsewhere. This firm, then, will be thrown back to more problematic bonus 
calculations. 
 
2. Exit Payments 
 
Firms also pay bonuses on entry and exit. Bonuses for signing are 
unsurprising, assuming a competitive market for the best managers. Bonuses 
for leaving, whether by firing, retirement, or acquisition, are more 
disturbing,113 competitive market or not. The average severance package 
equals three or more years of compensation, with only two percent of firms 
reducing it in the event the CEO finds new work. The critics argue that firing 
should not be a cash bonanza.114  
Exit payments still can be defended in theory. Long-term value creation 
follows from long-term investment under uncertainty. A payment that 
cushions failure arguably encourages risk-taking, for whatever the reputational 
consequences of forced exit, the executive does not have to worry about 
personal cash flow. This argument resonates especially well with respect to 
undervalued firms whose executives might be unjustly blamed for a 
languishing stock price. It also comes to bear in defense of golden parachutes 
triggered by acquisitions, as the bonus encourages a neutral posture with 
respect to sale of the company.115   
Questions still arise, however. The golden parachute makes sense because 
exit coincides with a premium payment to the other shareholders more easily 
secured with the executive’s cooperation. Other terminations, whether for 
retirement or incompetence, do not coincide with such upside events. If these 
exiting executives already are the beneficiaries of supersize pay packages, cash 
flow should not be a near-term problem. In addition, the exit payment, by 
insuring against failure even as the executive is richly compensated at present, 
could diminish incentives to succeed. The tournament incentive obtains only 
for those trying to reach the top team. For the winners, continued high-
powered incentives depend on the post-tournament compensation package. 
Of course, reputational incentives motivate executives whatever their pay 
arrangements. But recent decades’ experience counsels against reliance on 
reputation. If reputation mattered greatly, firms presumably would revert to 
the practice of three decades ago and remit the lion’s share of compensation 
in the form of straight salary, saving the shareholders the dilution costs of 
                                                                                                            
113. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 88-89. 
114. Id. at 132-35. 
115. See REDA, supra note 69, at 231-32. 
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supersize equity compensation. The system abandoned reliance on reputation 
a decade and a half ago when it shifted its focus to high-powered incentives. 
Whatever the system’s present shortcomings, turning back is not a plausible 
option.  
 
F. Summary 
  
This part began with two questions. First, what kind of manager-
shareholders are prevailing incentive compensation practices likely to 
produce? Second, does the shareholder interest provide a coherent normative 
yardstick with which to evaluate prevailing practices?  
The answer to the first question depends on the case. With an 
undervalued firm, the managers are likely to resemble long-term, fundamental 
value shareholders. With an overvalued firm, present practice aligns their 
interest with short-term noise traders, making it rational for managers to 
make suboptimal investments, distort financial reports, and follow suboptimal 
payout practices. The informational advantage that comes with the managers’ 
inside positions exacerbates the problem. 
The answer to the second question is yes and no. Sometimes, as with 
some bonus payments, the shareholder interest answers normative questions 
with a unitary voice. But responses often depend on the shareholders’ type, 
the state of the market, and the undervaluation or overvaluation of the 
particular firm’s stock. The noisier the stock market and the more overvalued 
the firm’s stock, the less coherent the signal from the shareholder interest. 
The shareholder interest will more likely be united, and management’s 
incentives will more likely be well aligned with it when the firm’s stock is 
undervalued. Undervalued firms attract the fundamental value interest; noise 
traders stay away. 
But suppose that managers of all firms are prone to believe that the 
market undervalues their stock? One often enough hears managers 
complaining that the market underappreciates their firms’ stock. If 
widespread belief in undervaluation is the case, it helps explain the laxity in 
prevailing practice, for conventional plans make more economic sense 
assuming undervalued stock. But the incentive problem is simultaneously 
aggravated. Some managers may believe their stock to be underappreciated 
when the stock in fact is overvalued. Managers of other overvalued firms may 
accurately appraise the situation. Either way, incentive pay schemes invite 
suboptimal investment, inaccurate financial reports, and skewed payout 
policy. 
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III.   THE VOLATILE SHAREHOLDER INTEREST AND 
THE DEBATE OVER SUPERSIZE PAY 
 
The debate over executive compensation focuses on the quality of the 
bargaining space in which corporate boards and top team members effect 
trade-offs between incentives and compensation. 
The leading critics, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, charge that 
compensation practices fail to satisfy the validation standard of an arm’s-
length contract. Managers, they say, possess and effectively wield power, 
assuring that compensation prevails over incentives and that performance 
rewards come on easy terms.116  Bebchuk and Fried make a short, direct 
prescription, reasoning as follows: given that (a) the victims of the imbalanced 
arrangement are the shareholders and (b) the injury is due to management 
empowerment, it follows that (c) the only plausible cure lies in empowering 
the shareholders.117 
Those who view the governance system more favorably offer three 
defenses of pay practices. First, the same phenomena that the critics ascribe 
to executive empowerment can be better explained in terms of the economic 
relationship between risk and return, as higher risks attending equity-based 
pay must be compensated with higher upside payouts. Second, to the extent 
the practice falls short of the arm’s-length ideal, informational shortcomings 
are responsible. Boards incorrectly believe that stock options are a bargain 
mode of compensation and tend to overvalue them in comparison to cash 
payments. Third, whatever the shortcomings of the practice, the system is 
fundamentally sound. Managers have on the whole done well for the 
shareholders since shifting to performance pay in the early 1990s. Loud 
attacks only enhance the political credibility of the outsider social critics, 
whose calls for social justice will only crimp the incentive system. 
This part reviews this debate against the background of volatile 
shareholder behavior. It shows that less ground separates the various 
positions than first appears. Both sides agree that incentive compatibility must 
be traded off against present compensation. They thus together hold open a 
door for the perverse effects of speculative shareholding. 
 
                                                                                                            
116. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 4-5, 61-117. 
117. Id. at 10-12, 189-216. 
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A. Power and Rents 
 
Bebchuk and Fried’s normative base point is a model of arm’s-length 
bargaining. Under the model, executive pay packages should reward an 
executive with a sum in excess of his or her reservation price; should contain 
terms that encourage the executive to increase the value of the firm; and 
should avoid terms that reduce the value of the firm.118  More particularly, 
“arm’s length” means modifying existing arrangements to add more upside 
pull. Stock options should be priced out-of-the-money at grant and the price 
should be indexed so as to filter out market-wide advances.119  Reloading and 
backdoor repricing should be prohibited.120  Retention constraints should be 
imposed.121  Bonus triggers should be performance-sensitive, and exit 
payments should be curtailed.122 
 
1. The Arm’s-Length Bargain 
 
Compensation packages, say Bebchuk and Fried, do not conform to the 
arm’s-length model because managers influence independent directors. 
Restating the point, managers use power to extract rents, defined as benefits 
better than those available under an arm’s-length bargain.123  A prediction 
follows: the more power a manager possesses, the greater the rents in the pay 
package.124  Power, of course, cannot be observed and quantified directly, 
forcing Bebchuk and Fried to back their positive assertion with inferences 
drawn from institutional arrangements. They point out that corporate 
institutions are ill-suited to foster arm’s-length bargaining between top 
managers and their corporate employers, drawing on a list of shortcomings 
well known to students of corporate governance.125 
                                                                                                            
118. Id. at 18-19. Jensen and Murphy describe a similar base point, noting that the firm faces a 
trade-off with respect to the amount of pay conceded and the hiring of better-motivated 
employees. Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 20-21. 
119. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 137-46, 159-62. 
120. Id. at 164-70. 
121. Id. at 174-85. 
122. Id. at 121-36. 
123. Id. at 5. 
124. Id. at 63. 
125. More particularly, outside directors tend to be loyal to or dominated by the CEO due to 
process infirmities such as large numbers, CEO chairmanship, interlocks, and financial 
dependence. Id. at 80-82. In addition, most firms lack a substantial outside shareholder, 
the financial interest of whom would influence bargaining over pay. Id. at 82-83. 
Oversight by large institutional shareholders ameliorates the problem, but tends to be 
sporadic across firms. Id. at 83. 
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Bebchuk and Fried’s assertions about power, rents, and the boardroom 
bargaining context all follow from a basic assumption concerning the 
appropriate trade-off between incentives and compensation: an arm’s-length 
deal, they assert, would tightly tie pay to performance. At first this seems 
surprising; one somehow expects a firmer foundation than an intuitive 
association of hurdle height and value creation. But, on reflection, Bebchuk 
and Fried have no basis for proceeding other than by raw assertion. After all, 
we have no robust positive theory of optimal incentive compensation. The 
absence of a theory also explains why process infirmities figure so 
prominently in Bebchuk and Fried’s substantive case, for if managers possess 
a bargaining advantage and intrinsically prefer more compensation and less 
incentive compatibility, then the resulting contract will reflect their 
preference. Given Bebchuk and Fried’s assumption respecting the appropriate 
trade-off, the contract is ipso facto substantively infirm.  
Bebchuk and Fried bump up against the problem of trading off 
incentives and compensation at two critical points in their analysis. The issue 
arises when they propose stricter terms for option plans, like out-of-the-
money pricing and indexing. Both of these increase the option price and thus 
decrease the value of each option granted. They propose a reciprocal 
adjustment: the number of options granted can be increased to adjust for the 
price increase so that the present value of the grant (and thus the 
compensation) remains unchanged.126  Here, in effect, incentives and 
compensation synchronize perfectly so that the firm’s value can be increased 
due to intensified management effort without management having to give up 
even a single dollar of compensation value. Although the managers may end 
up working harder in exchange for the same overall compensation value, the 
harder work is rewarded with a bigger upside payoff.  
The trade-off problem also arises with respect to retention constraints. 
All other things being equal, a tighter restraint on alienation decreases the pay 
plan’s compensation value by blocking the executive’s access to liquidity and 
portfolio diversification. But here, Bebchuk and Fried propose no Pareto-
optimal swap. Instead, they see a pie to be sliced. An “efficient” contract, they 
say, slices carefully, striking a balance between the competing interests with 
staged holding periods that would vary from case to case.127  A question 
arises: Why not gross up again in this case, compensating the executive with a 
larger number of inalienable shares so as to make up for the loss in value to 
                                                                                                            
126. Id. at 140-43. 
127. Id. at 174-76. 
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the alienation restraint? Bebchuk and Fried appear to intuit a limit to 
usefulness of tit-for-tat trades of compensation for incentives. 
The differential treatment is puzzling, given the strong commonalities in 
the two cases. In both, present value would be increased in exchange for 
incentive compatibility. The difference is that in the first case, the gross-up 
pays for forward motion in the stock price, while in the second case, it guards 
against perverse effects. Perhaps the benefits of forward motion justify 
increased compensation because the firm is projected to be more valuable net 
of the trade, where downside-avoided costs of misalignment with the 
speculative shareholder interest are more difficult to confront and gauge. 
Note that such a judgment is more likely to follow if the shareholder is 
modeled in a unitary and benign mold.  
Other factors also may be at work. Perhaps the problem identified by 
Hart creeps into the option compensation scenario at some point: full 
incentive compatibility may just cost too much in terms of the percentage 
interest in the firm conceded. But trade-offs made in practice probably follow 
from a very different intuition. Corporate actors may perceive a small-scale 
trade-off or no trade-off at all because they perceive the management interest 
at stake in the case of retention constraints to be more legitimate than that 
implicated in a negotiation over price. In this view, diversification and 
liquidity are to shareholding what freedom of movement is to citizenship, and 
only a limited concession can reasonably be expected at the bargaining table. 
So limited is the concession demanded that the question of countervailing 
compensation never arises. Significantly, this approach also tends to imply a 
unitary and benign model of the shareholder. 
A contrasting approach to the trade-off should be put on the table for 
consideration. Under this, the firm “just says no” to short-term liquidity and 
diversification because proper incentive alignment should not be negotiable. 
To remit the matter of a long-term time horizon to the black box of arm’s-
length contracting leaves open the possibility of perverse effects. Even 
assuming an arm’s-length bargaining context, the more bargaining power 
brought to the table by the executive, the more the incentives are skewed 
toward the speculative shareholder model. Executive pay plans have two 
purposes: to compensate and to incentivize. If, in the context of a package 
that mixes straight salary, cash bonuses, and equity awards, it is the incentive 
purpose that justifies the equity-based component, then it is unclear why 
retention constraints automatically must be countered by significant 
concessions to the compensation objective. 
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2. Shareholder Empowerment 
 
The skew toward the speculative interest persists when Bebchuk and 
Fried set out a menu of governance improvements. Some of the items on the 
list would tweak the present system so as to make it more likely that the 
shareholder voice registers inside boardrooms. For example, transparency 
could be enhanced. All compensation could be reported with a dollar value 
attached, and executive stock sales could be directly reported by the 
company.128  In addition, the shareholder vote could be made more 
meaningful, with separate votes on different segments of compensation plans 
giving shareholders the opportunity to pinpoint objectionable provisions.129  
Other proposals on the menu are more radical and would empower the 
shareholders, fundamentally changing the system. For example, binding 
shareholder initiatives on compensation could be permitted.130  More than 
that, the board could lose its legally vested control of the agenda over 
important corporate legislation so that shareholders could remove 
entrenching provisions.131  Finally, shareholders could have access to the 
ballot on terms broader than those recently proposed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.132 
As the proposals become more radical, volatile shareholder behavior 
becomes more of a problem, or at least holds out no circumstantial guarantee 
of a solution. To see why, consider the counterfactual possibility of a decade 
in all respects like the 1990s, except that Bebchuk and Fried’s shareholder 
access reforms are in place. The question is whether the shareholder voice 
rises up to insist on reforms assuring that compensation packages hold out no 
perverse effects respecting investments, financial reports, and payout policy. 
The scenario is highly unlikely. Shareholders at the time, including the 
institutional investors on which access schemes rely, were happy to ride 
market momentum. It took a bear market and scandals to trigger shareholder 
demands about bad mergers and the quality of financial reports. At the same 
time, on some compensation issues, shareholders probably have unified and 
                                                                                                            
128. Id. at 192-94. The Securities and Exchange Commission, apparently influenced by all the 
criticism, has proposed new rules requiring more extensive disclosures of executive 
compensation arrangements. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Executive 
Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Release Nos. 33-8655, 34-53185, 71 F.R. 
6541 (Feb. 8, 2006). 
129. Id. at 197. 
130. Id. at 198. 
131. Id. at 211-12. 
132. Id. at 210. For an extended discussion, see Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
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unproblematic interests. Out-of-the-money pricing and indexing stand out as 
possibilities. As to these matters, which go purely to the issue of “bang for 
the buck,” shareholder access might have a consistently beneficial effect. 
Meanwhile, the access cure holds out minuses as well as plusses. 
 
B. Defensive Tactics 
  
Defenders of the practice respond to the critics at three levels. The first 
level presents a full-dress defense of the prevailing practice. The second level 
steps back to admit process infirmities, but to reject the unequal bargaining 
power description. The third level steps farther back still to admit 
management empowerment but to argue that the system is robust 
nonetheless. 
  
1. The Fair Deal 
 
The full-dress defense, put forward by Professor Murphy and others, 
draws on the economic relationship between risk and return to describe 
prevailing compensation practice as a fair trade.133  This analysis turns on 
comparison of outside and insider option valuation. From the firm’s point of 
view, the cost of an executive stock option is the cash consideration the firm 
would receive from a third party investor for the same contingent interest in 
the stock. But third-party investors and firm employees differ in a critical 
respect as option buyers. Third-party investors are fully diversified and 
positioned to hedge the risk attending the option position.134  They 
accordingly are risk-neutral, where employees are underdiversified and risk-
averse. It follows that the option’s value to the employee is less than its value 
to the third party.135  It further follows that an option makes no sense when 
considered as pure compensation in comparison to cash: in order to 
constitute $1 of pay in the eyes of the employee, option compensation must 
be increased to make up for the employee’s valuation discount. The option 
thereby costs the firm more than the $1 in value the employee receives. An 
option nevertheless might make sense as incentive compensation.136  But the 
                                                                                                            
133. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives (Harvard 
NOM Research Paper No. 00-05, Nov. 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
 252805 [hereinafter Hall & Murphy 2002]. 
134. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost 
of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 859-60 (2002) [hereinafter Murphy 2002]. 
135. Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 38. 
136. To expand upon the claim of inefficient use of stock options, Murphy looks to grants to 
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overall terms of an arm’s-length option package should be expected to reflect 
the employee’s risk aversion. This explains terms that otherwise could be seen 
as giveaways, such as exercise prices set at-the-money rather than at a 
discount, the failure to index the exercise price,137 and the allowance of both 
early exercise138 and stock sales after exercise.139 
This fair deal emerges only on a critical assumption—that the employee’s 
compensation objective and the firm’s incentive objective may be traded off 
without any further scrutiny of the resulting contract’s incentive properties. 
This contrasts sharply with Bebchuk and Fried’s assumption that an arm’s-
length deal tightly ties pay to performance and avoids harm to the firm. It also 
leads to a strange result when viewed through the lens of this Article’s 
typology of shareholding. In the fair deal story, the executive bargains to 
attain the status of a fully diversified outside shareholder with full exit rights. 
The bargained-for status invites the executive to take the speculative mindset, 
much like an aggressive mutual fund. The question asked above comes up 
again: Why should a bargaining zone holding out that result be deemed 
normatively acceptable? 
Substantive scrutiny of incentive effects cannot be avoided under the fair-
deal story’s own basic assumptions. The trade-offs that make the deal fair 
follow from the assumption that stock options, viewed solely as 
compensation, amount to an intrinsically inefficient form of compensation. It 
follows that option compensation can only be justified based on the 
incentives it creates. 
A justificatory standard can be set loosely or strictly. The relaxed standard 
takes a Kaldor-Hicks approach, i.e., the value of the incentives created must 
                                                                                                            
employees outside of the top team, noting that in 2002, ninety percent of options granted 
went to employees below the management level. Hall & Murphy 2003, supra note 72, at 
16. The efficiency objection implicates the tournament justification. Since options are 
worth less to employees than their opportunity cost to the firm, option compensation 
makes sense only when it provides the best available means to import high-powered 
incentives. This is not the case with subordinate employees; for them, the firm’s internal 
advancement tournament and the prospect of equity compensation in the event of a 
tournament victory already provide incentives. In addition, within the general employee 
population, it is impossible to tell whose effort improves the stock price, inviting free-
riding among the beneficiaries of an equity-based reward system. Id. at 16-17. 
137. Hall & Murphy 2002, supra note 133, at 3. 
138. Id. at 13. 
139. John E. Core, Wayne Guay, and David F. Larcker point out that if the executive already 
holds the firm’s stock at the time of the option grant and is allowed to sell on a one-to-
one basis as options are exercised, the executive will place the same value on the option as 
a third-party investor. See John Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A 
Survey 30 (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
 276425. 
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exceed the options’ opportunity cost as compensation and the costs of 
perverse effects. This allows incentive incompatibility to be traded for 
compensation so long as the overall result makes the firm more valuable. Real 
world trade-offs could only be evaluated by intuition, of course; here, as with 
any other exercise in valuation, present verification is not a possibility. The 
strict standard takes the “just say no” approach mooted above and aspires to 
a Pareto-optimal result, in which the value of the incentives created must 
exceed the options’ opportunity cost, and the scheme may allow no 
foreseeable perverse effects. This standard’s benefit lies in the imposition of 
retention constraints on a per se basis. Bargaining and unverifiable cost-benefit 
trade-offs proceed in respect of the other elements of the deal. Assuming an 
arm’s-length context, the executive with bargaining power gets a gross-up in 
the number of shares granted; the executive with fewer chips at the table 
comes away with reduced compensation value. 
 
2. The Free Lunch Fallacy 
 
Now we turn to a process defense mooted to counter the charge of 
executive empowerment. This begins with the same assertion as the fair deal 
defense: stock options, viewed as compensation, fail to pass the cost-benefit 
test. The follow-up assertion is that board members fail to appreciate the 
costs. They incorrectly believe stock options to be a bargain mode of 
compensation and overvalue options in comparison to cash payments by 
underestimating the options’ economic cost to the shareholders whose stakes 
they dilute.140   
Jensen and Murphy use this point to account for a number of practices. 
For example, during the 1990s, firms continued to grant the same number of 
stock options year after year even as their stock prices doubled, causing the 
value of incentive grants to balloon. Had pay plans been tightly focused on 
performance sensitivity, the number of options would have been cut back as 
the market rose. In contrast, when the market fell after 2000, option value 
decreased in lockstep with it. Had the value of the grants been the center of 
attention, rather than the absolute number of shares granted, further 
adjustments would have been required.141  (Indeed, if management were all-
powerful, the market decline by itself should have caused a gross-up in the 
numbers.)  For Jensen and Murphy, this “free lunch” fallacy does a better job 
of accounting for practices during the past decade and a half than executive 
                                                                                                            
140. Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 37-39.  
141. See id. at 37. 
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empowerment. They also look to lack of sophistication to explain the absence 
of indexing: prior to 2005,142 firms were required under GAAP to expense the 
value of indexed options from their earnings, while no deduction was 
required for fixed-price, unindexed options. It follows that boards gave up 
performance sensitivity not because they were dominated but because they 
were naively fixated on earnings per share (EPS), and the applicable GAAP 
was badly articulated.143 
Murphy takes this a step farther, folding the free lunch fallacy into the fair 
deal story. The firm grants options not to incentivize, but because it 
mistakenly believes them to be cheap compensation.144  It follows that 
concessions keyed to the managers’ risk aversion—the fixed price set at 
market and the absence of restraints on alienation—bother the firm little 
because it does not view them as costly. The manager would prefer an 
exercise price set below market; the firm would prefer an exercise price above 
market; and they split the difference when they set the price at the market.145 
This analysis suffers from the same infirmity as the substantive defense in 
chief. The mistaken perception of low cost starts out as a positive observation 
that counters the power description, casting board decisionmaking in the 
positive light of good faith. But the observation ends up as a statement of 
purpose, and the purpose is compensation taken alone. The transformation 
creates a normative problem. Given that stock options are intrinsically 
inefficient when viewed only as compensation, a board that proceeds on this 
basis and trades away incentive properties may be making a bad deal.  
The lack of sophistication resonates better as pure description. Of course, 
one can only go so far in depicting board members as dumb money. But the 
characterization still carries due to the agency context: board members are not 
trading for their own accounts when approving compensation packages, and 
they operate in a cooperative environment. Given these qualifications, it is 
plausible to model businesspeople reacting differently to cash and scrip. At 
the same time, EPS matters in the boardroom because it matters to noise 
traders in the markets. A boardroom seminar on basic financial economics 
accordingly would fall short as a cure. For whatever reason—and the fact that 
someone else’s money is being spent provides a good reason—the economic 
costs of equity kickers are not perceived as equivalent to those of cash 
payments. 
                                                                                                            
142. See SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 2004). 
143. Murphy 1998, supra note 4, at 21. 
144. Murphy 2002, supra note 134, at 865-66. 
145. Id. at 863-64. 
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Admitting lack of sophistication into the picture detracts from the power 
explanation only if we define power narrowly as the authority to direct the 
actions of others, the power possessed by a sovereign or a military superior. If 
we relax the definition and describe power in terms of a position to exploit 
others economically, lack of sophistication fits neatly into the power 
description. The unequal bargaining power described in contract law is power 
in this lesser mode. It is also the mode of empowerment referenced by the 
critics. 
 
3. Substantial Performance 
 
The third defense makes still more concessions. Just as management 
power is hard to prove, so is its presence hard to deny. Many defenders 
accordingly concede it a place in the institutional description.146  Some even 
concede that some managers take excessive rewards, that equity 
compensation is more liquid than shareholders would want, and that perverse 
incentives have cropped up in the form of accounting manipulation.147  The 
dispute goes to the normative implications of the diagnosis of systemic 
imperfection. Here is the question: To what extent does the system succeed 
or fail in cost-effectively channeling the energy of empowered managers to 
productive ends that serve the shareholder interest? To answer the question is 
to make a judgment call. Defenders of the practice make a three-part case for 
relative success.  
The first part of the defensive case takes a broad view and looks at the 
bright side. Shareholders, it is said, should be pleased with the way things 
have gone in the last decade and a half. Returns, measured net of the cost of 
executive compensation, have been generally higher since the switch to 
option-based compensation. And the shift did succeed in aligning 
management interests with those of the shareholders to a greater extent than 
in the past. Meanwhile, from 1992 to 2000, growth of gross domestic product 
                                                                                                            
146. See Hall & Murphy 2003, supra note 72, at 27-28 (reporting sympathy with the view that 
pay decisions are not made by truly independent boards, but contending that rent 
extraction is not a compelling explanation); Holmström & Kaplan, supra note 1, at 13 
(agreeing that the biggest payees use positions of power to command excessive awards); 
Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 54 (recommending changes in structural and 
psychological environment and noting that “changes in these practices will require a major 
change in the power relationship between the board and the CEO”); see also John E. Core 
et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay without Performance? 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 
1160-61 (2005) (agreeing that pay structures reflect power and a positive correlation 
between power and pay). 
147. Holmström & Kaplan, supra note 1, at 3-4, 12-14. 
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in the U.S. was higher than in any of Italy, France, Britain, Germany, or 
Japan.148   
Defenders also point to governance improvements initiated in the 1990s. 
Boards became smaller and more independent, shareholders became more 
vigilant, compensation committees became the norm, and federal disclosure 
regulations required greater transparency than ever before.149  Shareholders 
apparently welcomed the shift to option compensation as they enjoyed the 
bull market of the 1990s. In contrast, a much smaller net-pay increase to 
management during the 1980s triggered a populist backlash, due to the 
association of high salaries with layoffs, plant closings, and downsizing.150  
Finally, the defenders argue that problems with executive compensation 
after the year 2000 mainly concern a few cases of abuse, and that any 
breakdowns due to the strain of the 1990s boom market have been addressed 
quickly.151  Cases where high pay and poor performance coincide can be 
identified statistically and dealt with accordingly. The existence of bad apples 
does not compel the conclusion that the whole economy suffers from 
governance problems.152 
No one on either side of the debate questions any of these points. The 
matter comes down to a dispute over the characterization accorded to a 
system that is admittedly dysfunctional. There is no objective resolution. 
Meanwhile, the whole discussion deflects attention from the important 
question: Assuming that equity incentive compensation can be better 
designed, should it be better designed? The answer clearly is yes.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To the extent equity incentive compensation turns managers into 
speculative shareholders, supersize pay will yield perverse effects. Redirecting 
incentives to the investment mode of shareholding cures those problems but 
creates new ones. A compensation plan designed to create manager-investors 
delays supersize cash payoffs in order to keep the focus on long-term 
fundamental value. The delay reduces the value of the compensation package. 
                                                                                                            
148. Id. at 3-4. 
149. Hall & Murphy 2003, supra note 72, at 27-28. 
150. Murphy 1998, supra note 4, at 1. Moreover, in Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 1, 
the authors point out the resurgence of outrage directed at the amount of pay in 
connection with recent scandals. They are impressed by the negative publicity attracted by 
the Jack Welch and Richard Grasso retirement packages, noting that nobody questioned 
the quality of the performance of either. 
151. See id. at 3-4. 
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One must then ask whether the purpose of “incentive compensation” is 
actually to incentivize, or merely to compensate. To the extent that the 
answer is “both,” perverse effects remain a constant possibility. It is time to 
raise the bar and emphasize incentives. Incentive compatibility should be the 
first priority, with the level of compensation being fixed in a framework that 
lacks foreseeable perverse effects. 
 
